'The design accords with the best practice project principles, but there is an expansion of the objectives and costs as interested parties give their views on what the new systems could do.

An invitation to tender is issued, but the commitment to the timescales and design is too great to heed warnings from perspective end-users, unions or one or two reputable prospective suppliers that the timetable is too tight or the scope unrealistically ambitious.

After contracts are awarded fuller consultation with potential end-users begins but is inadequate or self- selective.

The supplier begins to realise it has over-estimated its ability to understand the customer's business and convert this into IT systems, while the customer realises it has over-estimated the capability of the supplier.

More often than not the supplier realises too that it has not asked enough questions before signing the contract, and the customer has not understood its business sufficiently to explain its work practices, the complexities of the project, the risk of failure and real costs to the supplier.

The timetable begins to lengthen and the projected costs increase but the commitment is too great to allow any indecision or U-turn.

As the project begins to founder, the cover-up begins. Failure is depicted as success. MPs do not get well-rounded answers to questions.

Failure can no longer be hidden because the public or the departmental end users are affected by the contract's being abandoned, changed, re written or re-awarded.

Years later there are sometimes reports by the National Audit Office and the commons Public Accounts Committee.

The department says it has learned from the mistakes of the past.

Those who give these assurances that lessons have been learned move on and are replaced by new personnel who embark on projects which repeat the mistakes of the past.

The cycle begins anew.'